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Lucas Núñez, California Institute of TechnologyIn this paper we use latent class analysis to identify the four faces of political participation. Previous research has generally
focused on conventional forms of political participation (for example, voting), with some research looking as well at
unconventional forms of political participation, like protesting. Moreover, most research studies these forms of partic-
ipation separately. However, citizens actually engage in both conventional and unconventional participation simulta-
neously, and here we present a methodology that can identify citizens who engage in both, neither, or only one form of
participation. Using our approach, we examine a series of hypotheses about how social, political, and economic griev-
ances lead citizens to engage in each face of political participation. We apply this methodology to recent survey data from
Argentina, which we argue is an excellent case for studying both forms of participation simultaneously. This application
demonstrates the utility of the latent class approach for studying the four faces of political participation.olitical participation is how citizens communicate their
opinions, interests, and needs to government and the
broader society (Verba and Nie 1972). It is not yet clear
whether citizen involvement affects policy outcomes.1 But by
electing representatives and voicing their views in a variety of
ways, individuals develop a sense of belonging, responsibility,
efﬁcacy, and trust in democratic institutions that they would
not otherwise experience.2 Thus, political participation is not
just important because of its potential implications for public
policy, but because it makes citizens. What types of citizens
it makes, we argue in this paper, depends on the availability of
opportunities for political participation, individual circum-
stances, and their political experiences.
In established democracies, diverse forms of involvement
are available. Citizens can participate in conventional activi-
ties that are embedded in the political system and institutions,
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review of that literature, see Fowler (2013).
2. For research on the association between government trust and political efﬁ
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activity is voting, although citizens can also petition their rep-
resentatives, attend meetings of political parties, assist cam-
paigns, or evenrun forofﬁce.But there arealsounconventional
activities, in which individuals relate to the polity in less or-
thodox ways. The most widely practiced among these activi-
ties are protests and strikes (Barnes andKaase 1979). Research
on political participation has mostly focused on conventional
activities, especially voting. This is largely because voting is an
important aspect of participatory democracy, but also because
it is easy to study. Other aspects of political behavior have re-
ceived less study (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). In
particular, unconventional participation has received limited
attention from scholars, most likely because unconventional
political behavior is difﬁcult to conceptualize and hard to
measure (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Chong 1991). This narrow
focus has hindered our understanding of political participa-ivision of Humanities and Social Sciences at the California Institute o
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4. For example, demonstrations fueled by economic hardship in late
2001 led to the downfall of the De la Rua government (Arce and Man-
gonnet 2013); the death of two protesters due to police repression led to
the early departure of the Duhalde government (Bonner 2009). A blockade
of an international bridge between Argentina and Uruguay by environ-
mental groups that began in 2003 fueled international tensions between
the countries (Payne 2011). Also, protests and road blockades by farmers
and landowners in 2008 produced signiﬁcant shortages in the county and
resulted in an important schism between President Fernández and her vice
president (Calvo and Murillo 2012).
5. The new law (Ley 26.744 Modiﬁcatoria del Código Nacional Elec-
toral, Congreso de la Nación Argentina, 2012) imposes a ﬁne of AR$50 for
missing the primaries and AR$100 for the general elections. In US dollars,
the general election ﬁne corresponded to US$17.12 in 2013 and US$10.47
in 2015, and represented 3% of the monthly minimum salary in 2013, and
1.8% in 2015. Several groups of electors are excluded from paying the
ﬁnes. These include voters over the age of 70 or under 18, those who are
sick (with proof ), or those more than 500 kilometers away from their
voting location during election day. If the ﬁne is not paid within a 60-day
period, offenders face restrictions in administrative procedures with na-
tional, provincial, and municipal governments for one year and cannot be
employed in the public sector for three years.
Volume 79 Number 4 October 2017 / 1387tion.Moreover, by studying conventional and unconventional
activities individually, most research ignores the possibility
that political actions are intertwined.3
We take the literature in a new direction by using a novel
methodological approach to modeling political participation,
one that considers conventional and unconventional activities
simultaneously, as expressions of each individual’s interests
and concerns. To this end, we introduce a two-dimensional
latent class model that captures individuals’ propensities to
participate in several political activities. Our ﬁndings show
that the way in which participation in the different activities
loads on the two dimensions provides some rationale for the
traditional classiﬁcation of political activities into conven-
tional and unconventional ones. That is, activities generally
considered to be conventional load higher in one of the two
dimensions, while activities generally considered unconven-
tional load more in the other dimension. But there are also
activities that load similarly on both dimensions, defying sim-
ple ad hoc classiﬁcation. Importantly, however, our method-
ology allows thedata to determinewhich types of participatory
acts load onwhich dimension, rather than relying on arbitrary
classiﬁcations based on the researcher’s assumptions.
We use the different intensities in the latent variables to
identify what we term the four faces of political participation.
That is, some citizens will be more active in both the con-
ventional and the unconventional dimensions of political
activities (activists); others will be mostly disengaged from
politics (outsiders); and others will be more active in one di-
mension of political activities but not the other (agitators and
conventionals). As Dunning (2011, 333) argued, “ﬁghting
and voting can be strategic complements, rather than substi-
tutes. . . . The relevant question is not whether political actors
opt to participate in elections or engage in armed conﬂict, but
rather why and how they engage in both voting and ﬁghting.”
Our model then allows us to study how contextual variables
and individual level characteristics help explain the classiﬁ-
cation of citizens into a type, shedding light onwho engages in
the different combinations of participatory activities; that is,
who ﬁnds conventional and unconventional activities to be
substitutes or complements. Our main analysis is focused on
three experiential factors that the literature identiﬁes as con-
nected to political participation: economic worries, percep-
tions of corruption, and concerns about crime.3. One exception is Desposato and Norrander (2009), who look at the
gender gap in conventional and unconventional political participation in
Latin America using a broadly comparative approach. Dalton (2008)
analyses the relation between citizens’ sense of duty and participation in
conventional and unconventional activities, but his approach considers
these activities independently.
This content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms We apply this model of political participation to recent
data from Argentina, which provides an interesting case for
our analysis. While citizens in Argentina participate in all
sorts of conventional activities, unconventional political par-
ticipation, typically in the form of protests and street block-
ades, is an everyday ﬁxture of civic life (Arce andMangonnet
2013; Villalón 2002, 2007). Protest activity in Argentina has
also shown signiﬁcant effects on policy in the last 15 years.4
Thus, Argentina’s case allows for the study of the less fre-
quent political activities, the unconventional ones, together
with those more commonly observed and measured, making
it an ideal case for the analysis of the four faces of political
participation.
It is important to note that Argentina is a nation that prac-
tices compulsory voting. While compulsory voting was tradi-
tionally weakly enforced (Pintor and Gratschew 2002), the
electoral law was modiﬁed in 2012 (Ley 26.744) to impose
sanctions on those electors that did not vote.5 Despite these
changes in the law, turnout in presidential elections immedi-
ately before andafter the changes didnot change signiﬁcantly.6
Given that the change in the enforcement of mandatory vot-
ing did not have any signiﬁcant effect on voter participation,6. Turnout in the 2011 presidential elections stood at 80.2%, while
turnout in the 2015 presidential elections stood at 81.1%. Figure A1 in the
online appendix shows that while turnout increased in some provinces after
the reform, this increase was smaller than that observed between the two
presidential elections prior to the reform, suggesting that changes in turnout
corresponded mainly to pre-reform trends rather than the effect of legal
changes. Figure A2 shows that while turnout was generally increasing in
municipalities in Buenos Aires province prior to the reform, there is no
identiﬁable pattern after the reform was implemented.
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tivities. Furthermore, this also supports our argument that
compulsory voting law in Argentina (with or without en-
forcement) should not present a challenge in generalizing the
results of our paper to countries where voting is voluntary.
PARTICIPATORY TYPES AND THE MOTIVATION
FOR PARTICIPATION
Conventional forms of political participation have long been
the focus of research, in particular the act of voting. Voting is
a public activity, and data on who votes are readily available.
Much is known about who votes, and why citizens do not
vote, based on analyses of data from the United States (e.g.,
Abramson 1983; Leighley and Nagler 2013; Wolﬁnger and
Rosenstone 1980). But there is also a good amount of research
on other political activities, like contacting political ofﬁcials
(Rosenstone andHansen 1983), volunteering (Campbell 2006),
campaigning for candidates (Norris 2001), and other meth-
ods of direct involvement (Rosenberg 2008) (see also Mc-
Donald and Popkin 2001; Zukin et al. 2006).
Other activities, generally considered unconventional be-
havior, have received less attention from researchers. These
activities are more difﬁcult to study because individuals get
involved in them in a more irregular and infrequent man-
ner (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Chong 1991). This means that
unconventional political behavior is harder to conceptualize,
measure, and study. Yet political protests are widespread
around the world, and they can have a signiﬁcant effect on
policy and the viability of governments. Mass political pro-
tests during the Arab Spring led to signiﬁcant changes in the
political landscape in that region; protests in the late 1980s
in the Communist bloc contributed to the downfall of com-
munism in Eastern Europe; marches, boycotts, and sit-ins
during the 1960s civil rights movement contributed to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965
in the United States; the Occupy and Indignant movements
denouncing inequality and austerity measures gave momen-
tum to anti-establishment parties in several European coun-
tries. But not all protests are massive movements that sweep
across nations. Many protests are small, with a focused goal.
The examples are countless and present in almost every coun-
try: rallies to help crime victims in the neighborhood; em-
ployees demanding better working conditions; communities
trying to protect the environment around them; demon-
strations against police brutality, and so on. AsDalton (2008)
notes, there has been a shift in focus from electoral modes of
participation, to nonelectoralmethods of political action (see
alsoNorris 2001). Ignoring unconventional forms of political
participation hinders our understanding of the citizen as a
political animal.This content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Because of its more infrequent and irregular nature, ef-
forts to understand unconventional forms of participation
are hindered by the lack of data on the subject. Due to the
relative rarity of opportunities for studying unconventional
participation in established democracies, some of the most
notable studies of the subject have opted for measuring in-
dividuals’ potential for unconventional behavior instead of
actual involvement in unconventional activities (see, e.g.,
Barnes and Kaase [1979] and the criticism of this study by
Budge [1981]). The justiﬁcation for this approach has been
that, since individuals’ ability to participate in these activities
depends on the existence of opportunity structures (Jennings
and van Deth 1989), and since these structures are typically
issue-speciﬁc and may exist (or not) at any given moment in
time, then measures of actual involvement obtained using
survey methods are of little use (Barnes and Kaase 1979;
Jennings and van Deth 1989). Due to problems such as these,
researchers have not yet provided solid evidence of why pro-
tests happen, what triggers them, and who participates in
them.
But what drives individuals toward more unconventional
forms of political participation? In relatively open political
systems where civil liberties are well protected, protests can
provide a cheap and fast alternative to the potentially slow
and bureaucratic mechanisms of more traditional activities.
This is likely to be the case in transitional societies where
“the development of political institutions . . . does not keep
pace with social mobilization” (Milbrath and Goel 1977,
126). Systems that fail to protect civil liberties, where there
are few channels for public input into the political process,
or where government is unresponsive can frustrate citizens
to the point where they resort to protest and demonstration
(Chong 1991). Even in democratic countries where political
institutions are weak, there is a stronger tendency for citi-
zens to participate in unconventional activities to make their
voices heard (Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011).
But, at the same time, participation in unconventional activ-
ities can also have individual causes. In particular, dissatis-
faction, relative deprivation, the feeling of being left behind,
or ideological motivations are usually thought of as motiva-
tors for protest (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Mann 1970; Mil-
brath and Goel 1977; Muller 1979). Usually, the gap between
individuals’ expectations and achievements is viewed as mo-
tivation for individuals to move into more unconventional
activities like protests (Feirabend and Feirabend 1966; Gurr
1970; Sears and McConahay 1970). Other recent research
has stressed the importance of sponsoring groups, especially
the factors like the group’s political ideology, in determining
whether individuals decide to participate in violent uncon-
ventional political behavior (Thomas and Bond 2015)..070.231 on January 04, 2018 08:17:38 AM
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cost-beneﬁt framework. That is, whether an individual citi-
zen decides to engage in conventional or unconventional po-
litical activities (or both) depends on their perception of the
costs of that action, the potential beneﬁts of that action,
whether they think the action will affect the policies they are
concerned about, and on the citizen’s resources and concep-
tions of whether it is their duty to act (Riker and Ordeshook
1968). The factors that might alter this calculus for a citizen
are complex, and in many situations a particular factor might
increase the costs or beneﬁts of one type of activity (say con-
ventional participation), while reducing the costs or beneﬁts
of other activities (say unconventional participation). We use
a theoretical framework that links political, social, and eco-
nomic experiences to the costs and beneﬁts of different forms
of political participation, which focuses speciﬁcally on per-
sonal andnational economic conditions, political corruption,
and crime victimization.
This theoretical framework rests upon the notion that,
while theperceived beneﬁts of political action are partly driven
by people’s political motivations—particularly, the willingness
to express grievances caused by government failure—partici-
pation decisions are constrained by personal experiences with
adversity that limit people’s ability to bear participation costs.
The inﬂuence of distressful conditions is, thus, hard to predict,
since personal grievances and experiences of hardship may
affect the participation calculus in different ways. Although
propositions along these lines have been tested in previous
studies, little is known about the extent to which disappoint-
ment with government performance within different policy
domains (e.g., handling of the economy, and of issues such as
crime and corruption) may spur unconventional forms of
involvement, perhaps at the expense of participation in main-
stream activities.
In developing countries like Argentina, where large changes
in economic conditions are the rule (Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Talvi 2006), economic concerns could be an important trigger
for participation. Political scientists studying participation
have considered both the effects of personal ﬁnancial or eco-
nomic problems, such as being unemployed or struggling to
make ends meet, as well as national economic conditions that
affect the wider community of the country as a whole, like
dissatisfaction with the state of the economy, the unemploy-
ment rate, or the rate of inﬂation. Attributing blame to the
government and political parties for their failure to prevent
or address economic problems can enable voters to engage in
rational retrospective voting (Feldman 1982; Iyengar 1991).
Perhaps it is the nature of the economic problem—
whether it gives rise to collective or personal concerns—that
determines the direction of the inﬂuence of economic eval-This content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms uations on political participation. Blaming the government
for creating (or failing to ameliorate) poor economic con-
ditions may motivate individuals to connect to the political
process to express their dissatisfaction (Brody and Snider-
man 1977; Levin, Sinclair, and Alvarez 2016; Rosenstone
1982; Thomassen 1989). Depending on the availability and
effectiveness of traditional forms of involvement, these so-
cially located grievances may be channeled through insti-
tutionalized or noninstitutionalized means. Individuals hit
by economic adversity, however, may take it upon themselves
to improve their personal ﬁnancial outlook (Brody and Sni-
derman 1977; Rosenstone 1982) and may rather spend time
directly addressing their problems, or trying to force the
government to provide an immediate solution by disrupting
the normal state of affairs, than communicating their needs
through conventional modes. We thus expect personal ex-
periences with economic adversity to inhibit involvement in
conventional activities, but not in unconventional ones where
frustration with personal circumstances might actually stim-
ulate involvement.
Following these theories, we test the following hypotheses
regarding the impact of economic evaluations on political
participation:
H1a. Both conventional and unconventional partici-
pation are motivated by a negative outlook about the
prospects for the national economy.
H1b. A negative outlook for personal ﬁnances inhibits
conventional participation, but motivates unconven-
tional participation.
Attributing blame to the government and political parties
for their failure to address problems may also inﬂuence in-
dividual participation decisions. In Argentina, a nation with
relatively weak political institutions, where citizens are likely
to encounter incompetent bureaucracies and to personally
experience political clientelism andmisconduct (Balán 2011;
Canache andAllison 2005; Stokes 2005; Svensson 2005;Weitz-
Shapiro 2008), negative experiences with political actors could
be important drivers of political action. In particular, polit-
ical participation may be negatively affected by perceptions
of corruption. Like most of the literature on political par-
ticipation, the effects of corruption have focused mostly on
turnout. While some authors ﬁnd a positive relation between
corruption and voter turnout (Johnston 1983), the general
view, supported by empirical research, is that corruption has
a demobilizing effect (Birch 2010; Davis, Ai Camp, and
Coleman 2004; McCann and Dominguez 1998; Norris 2011;
Simpser 2013)..070.231 on January 04, 2018 08:17:38 AM
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of participation? Previous research on Bolivia has shown that
citizens who witness corruption are more likely to engage in
unconventional participation (Gingerich 2009). Those who
experience corruption may bemotivated to engage in protests
and other similar political activities intended to disrupt daily
life. Furthermore, political and economic corruption occur
typically, or are more widespread, where political institutions
are weak, where political actors act outside the law in order to
accomplish their goals. Previous research has shown that in
these types of situations, political participation will similarly
occur beyond the conventional pathways of politics (Bould-
ing 2010; Machado et al. 2011).
Consistent with previous research, we formulate the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H2. Perceptions of greater levels of corruption dis-
courage conventional participation but stimulate un-
conventional participation.
In Argentina, corrupt practices by politicians and law en-
forcement ofﬁcials are often associated with criminal activity
and episodes of violent crime. After having been considered
one of the safest in Latin America only a few decades ago, the
country has seen a large increase in crime rates and percep-
tions of insecurity in recent years, a situation that has spurred
the use of private self-defense measures, growth of the pri-
vate security industry, and changes in habits in the popula-
tion (Dammert and Malone 2008; Eaton 2008; Smulovitz
2003). In the context of this deteriorating situation, disap-
pointment with the success of government efforts to control
crime, particularly among those who have had personal ex-
periences with crime, could be a key determinant of partici-
pation decisions.
Until recently, crime victimization was not considered a
relevant variable in explaining political participation, as it
was taken as self-evident that crime victimization would gen-
erate a sense of powerlessness and a depressive state in vic-
tims that would cause them to withdraw from social activities
(Bateson 2012). While some recent studies have supported
this conventional wisdom (Trelles and Carreras 2012), there
is growing evidence suggesting that victims of violence and
crime may be more motivated to participate than their non-
victimized counterparts. Bellows and Miguel (2009), Blatt-
man (2009), and Voors et al. (2012) found that victims of
violent conﬂict during civil wars show increased levels of civic
engagement in postwar years. Bateson (2012), using survey
data from numerous countries, found that crime victims
show heightened levels of participation in political activities.
More recently, Hersh (2013) found that relatives of 9/11This content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms victims became more politically involved after the terrorist
attacks.
According to Bateson (2012), crime victimization may
stimulate political involvement, as victims or their relatives
may become instrumentally motivated activists who seek to
prevent or ﬁght the occurrence of crimes they were victims
of. As noted by the author, political activism by victims may
successfully affect public policy, as evidenced by the naming
of punitive laws after victims in different countries, with a
notable example being the Blumberg laws in Argentina. But
Bateson is careful to note that victims of crimes may also par-
ticipate for noninstrumental reasons. The anger felt by victims
may fuel emotions and energies that some may channel for
political ends. Other victims, striving to overcome feelings
of fear and powerlessness, may ﬁnd relief in expressing and
sharing their emotions by means of political activism.
While this argument implies that crime victims should
engage more actively in any kind of political activity, it is rea-
sonable to expect that they would do so with the feeling that
the system has failed them and would therefore be more
likely to choose noninstitutionalized means of involvement.
This is likely to be the case in Argentina. The growing sense of
insecurity, coupled with indignation brought about by cases
of police abuse, has fed the emergence of spontaneous protests
and organized groups working to affect the formulation of
security policies (Eaton 2008; Smulovitz 2003). These ob-
servations lead us to our third and last hypothesis:
H3a. Crime victimization encourages both conven-
tional and unconventional political participation.
H3b. The mobilization effect of crime victimization is
stronger for unconventional activities than for con-
ventional ones.
In the next section, we describe the methodology used to
(1) classify respondents into participatory types based on their
propensity to participate in more or less conventional activ-
ities and (2) test the above hypotheses about the inﬂuence of
personal concerns (over the state of the economy, spread of
corruption, and having been the victim of a crime) on con-
ventional and unconventional participation in Argentina.
METHODOLOGY
In the model we develop in this paper, citizens can participate
in multiple political activities. We model individuals’ pro-
pensity to participate in each activity using two binary latent
classes, one associated with more conventional behavior and
the other associated with more unconventional behavior;
and these classes can be affected in different ways by the co-.070.231 on January 04, 2018 08:17:38 AM
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fected by both the conventional and unconventional latent
classes, which in turn, allows us to derive a data-driven char-
acterization of the different political activities considered.
Latent predispositions toward conventional and uncon-
ventional participation can be a result of bothmeasurable and
unobserved factors, including sociodemographic attributes
that determine the acquisition of civic skills and individuals’
access to politically relevant resources such as money and
time, political attitudes and life experiences that contribute
to the development of individuals’ interest in politics and
public affairs, and personality traits and social connections,
that while often not directly measurable, can affect tenden-
cies toward political involvement. By explicitly considering
different latent predispositions for conventional and un-
conventional participation, this model allows us to study the
sources of each form of involvement. In particular, it allows
us to evaluate whether citizens’ dissatisfaction with the po-
litical establishment (due to the government’s poor handling
of the economy, its embrace of clientelistic practices, and its
inability to keep crime at bay) motivates involvement in more
unconventional activities, yet depresses participation in con-
ventional politics, or vice versa.
We conduct our analysis in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage,
we estimate individuals’ latent predispositions. This allows
us to classify respondents into four groups: (1) outsiders, who
are unlikely to be involved in political activities; (2) activists,
who are likely to participate in any political activity; (3) agi-
tators, who are more likely to participate in unconventional
activities than in conventional ones; and ﬁnally, (4) conven-
tionals, who are more highly predisposed toward conven-
tional participation. Previous studies of political participa-
tion alsoused a typological approach (Barnes andKaase 1979;
Milbrath1960;MilbrathandGoel, 1977;VerbaandNie1972).7
Barnes andKaase (1979), for instance, classify individuals into
ﬁve categories (inactives, conformists, reformists, activists, and
protesters) that are related to theonesdeﬁnedabove.Thus, our
paper reintroduces the typological approach, but our meth-
odology allows us to do so in a less arbitrary manner. Our
classiﬁcation, although in line with conventional wisdom, is
derived from the data. This is a key rationale for the use of the7. One of the ﬁrst studies of this kind is Milbrath (1960), who proposed
the classiﬁcation of individuals into three categories (gladiators, spectators,
and apathetics), based on their overall level of political involvement. Verba
and Nie (1972) proposed a different typology, classifying individuals into six
categories (inactives, voting specialists, communalists, parochial participants,
campaigners, and complete activists), depending on the type of conventional
activities they participate in. Milbrath and Goel (1977) and Barnes and Kaase
(1979) extended the typological approach by considering both conventional
and unconventional participation.
This content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms latent class model in this context: if some of these participa-
tory behaviors are uncorrelated with either latent predispo-
sition (conventional or unconventional), themodel will tell us
that; furthermore, the model will classify each type of partici-
pation based on the data, not based on arbitrary assumptions
made by researchers.
In the second stage, we study the role of economic, po-
litical, and social insecurities in shaping the classiﬁcation of
individuals into the four participatory types as a function of
our variables of interest: evaluation of the economy and per-
sonal ﬁnances, and crime victimization. In order to control
for individuals’ ability to bear participation costs, we include
measures of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics,
since these individual attributes are thought to affect individ-
uals’ access to politically relevant resources and skills (Brady,
Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Verba et al. 1995).
Formally, the ﬁrst step model speciﬁcation is given by the
following expression:
Yi,j ∼ Bernoulli(pi,j)
logit(pi,j)p aj 1 aC,j(TC,i 2 1)1 aU ,j(TU ,i 2 1),
where Yi,j is a binary indicator for participation in activity j
for individual i; pi,j is the probability that individual i par-
ticipates in activity j; aj is an intercept that varies by activity
j; TC,i denotes the conventional trait of individual i, which
can take values 1 (Low conventional trait) and 2 (High con-
ventional trait); TU,i denotes the unconventional trait of in-
dividual i, which can take values 1 (Low unconventional trait)
and 2 (High unconventional trait); aC,j is a nonnegative co-
efﬁcient capturing the inﬂuence of TC,i on involvement in ac-
tivity j; and aU,j is a nonnegative coefﬁcient capturing the
inﬂuence of TU,i on involvement in activity j. With the esti-
mated conventional and unconventional traits, we construct
the four two-dimensional types: outsiders, agitators, conven-
tionals, and activists.
To prevent label switching between latent classes in this
model, we need to impose some restrictions on the param-
eters. First, we restrict the effect of the conventional trait on
participation in street blockades to be zero (that is, aC,block p
0). Second, we restrict the effect of the unconventional trait
on participating in municipal meetings to be zero (that is,
aU ,Municipalmeeting p 0). Finally, we ﬁx the type of 14 individuals
who participate in all activities traditionally considered con-
ventional but in none of the ones traditionally considered
unconventional toTC,i p High and TU ,i p Low; and the type
of three individuals who participate in none of the activities
traditionally considered conventional but in all of the ones
traditionally considered unconventional to TC,i p Low and
TU ,i p High..070.231 on January 04, 2018 08:17:38 AM
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dividuals into the four combined type assignments from the
ﬁrst stage, taking care to incorporate classiﬁcation uncer-
tainty. We do so by ﬁrst drawing J samples from the esti-
mated distribution of participatory types for each individual,
then estimating a multinomial logit model to explain type
assignments for each jth draw, and ﬁnally combining the re-
sults of the J estimations into overall estimates that accurately
account for classiﬁcation uncertainty. We conducted a sim-
ulation study to determine the minimum value of J required
to successfully incorporate classiﬁcation uncertainty. Based on
the results of this study, we set Jp 30. After repeatedly esti-
mating the second-stage model using Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) methods, we pool parameter chains across all
J estimations and use the resulting matrix to summarize the
distribution of quantities of interest. In appendix B (apps. A–
D available online) we present the details of our simulation
study, and other details associated with the estimation of the
models we report in the next section of the paper.
In specifying the second-stage model, we assume that
each individual selected the combined type t that maximizes
his or her utility, where t ∈ T p foutsider, conventional,
agitator, activistg, and that utilities associated with each com-
bined type are a function of sociodemographic attributes, life
experiences, and political attitudes. As the main variables of
interest, we include evaluations of the national economy and
personal ﬁnances, crime victimization, and perceptions of
corruption. More formally, we model preferences over the
combined types using the following random utility model:
ui,t p XiBt 1 εi,t ,
where ui,t is the utility perceived by individual i from behav-
ing in line with type t; Xi is a vector of covariates explaining
preferences over the combined types; Bt is a vector of coef-
ﬁcients that varies by combined type t, capturing the impact
of covariates Xi on ui,t; and ei,t is an error term following an
extreme value distribution. In line with McFadden (1974),
we assume that individuals choose the combined type that
maximizes ui,t.8 To ensure the identiﬁcation of the model pa-
rameters, we set coefﬁcients associated with the baseline type
(outsiders), to zero. That is, we set B1 p 0 such that ui,1 p 0.8. Since error terms ei,t follow an extreme value distribution, the
probability that individual i has combined type t, qi,t, can be calculated as
follows:
qi,t p
eXiBt
o
t∈T
eXiBt
:
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We use data from the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Argentina survey
waves of the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)
conducted by Vanderbilt University and Universidad Tor-
cuato Di Tella with the ﬁeld work carried out by MBC Mori
Consultores.9 The project uses a national probability sam-
ple design of voting-age adults, with a total sample size of
1,410, 1,512, and 1,512, for 2010, 2012, and 2014, respectively.
The surveys involved face-to-face interviews conducted in
Spanish.
There are two important reasons why we chose Argentina
to test our hypotheses and apply our latent class model. First,
unlike many nations in the world, in Argentina unconven-
tional political activities are more common. As we have dis-
cussed earlier, protests, street blockades, and other forms of
unconventional activity occur with regularity in Argentina
and have been used by citizens to accomplish important po-
litical, economic, and social change. Second, because of the
relative frequency of unconventional political activities, there
is rich data on these activities in the LAPOP survey data. As
far as we are aware, there are few nations where such rich data
on unconventional political participation have been recently
collected. The richness of the LAPOP data on Argentina al-
lows us to not only look at a wide array of conventional and
unconventional forms of political behavior, it also provides
a wide set of important covariates that we can use for test-
ing our hypotheses. Thus, Argentina is an excellent case for
studying the four faces of political participation.
Using the LAPOP data, we deﬁne dependent variables
based on answers to a question about involvement in differ-
ent political activities during the year preceding the survey.
The activities considered are participating in a municipal
meeting; requesting help from municipal government; re-
questing help from a local authority; helping solve a problem
in the community; participating in a committee of improve-
ments; participating in professional, trade, or farmers’ asso-
ciations; and participating in meetings of a political party;
participating in peaceful protests; participating in street or
road blockades; and participating in strikes. While many of
these activities may not be considered political from the point
of view of American politics, they are so in the Argentinian
context. In particular, trade unions have been at the center of
Argentinian politics since at least the 1940s when the Peronist
movement developed; many trade union members build a
career in party politics, mostly supporting one or another
faction inthePeronistmovement.Farmers’associations jumped
to the center of the political scene during the 2008 conﬂict9. The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion
Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org, 2010, 2012, and 2014.
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ties’ export taxes and tend to be an important source of po-
litical organization in rural areas and smaller cities.10 Many
neighborhood associations developed in the aftermath of the
2001 Argentine economic crisis, particularly in lower income
areas, and have become increasingly intertwined with local
and national politics; in some cases, like the Organización
Barrial Tupac Amaru, they have developed into a powerful
political movement.
We excluded voting from the analysis in this paper. This
is because the compulsory nature of voting makes it less in-
teresting to study together with the political activities we con-
sider that are of a fundamentally different nature because of
their voluntary character. As we mentioned in the introduc-
tion, we do not believe this represents a signiﬁcant drawback
for our results.
In order to test our ﬁrst set of hypotheses we used ques-
tions about retrospective evaluations on the evolution of the
national economy and personal ﬁnances. Respondents were
asked whether they consider economic conditions improved,
remained the same, or worsened; and whether their personal
economic situation improved, remained the same, or wors-
ened in the last 12 months. To test our hypothesis concerning
the perception of corruption, we constructed a measure of
trust based on responses to a question that asked respondents
whether they believe, based on experience or what they have
heard, that corruption among public ofﬁcials in the country
is either very common, common, uncommon, or very un-
common. From this question we constructed a variable with
four values, from 0 (very uncommon) to 3 (very common).
For the last set of hypotheses, we used answers to a question
asking respondents whether they have been victims of rob-
bery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent
threats, or any other type of crime in the 12 months prior to
the survey.
For controls, we use age in years, years of education, gen-
der, self-reported nonwhite ethnicity, ideology on a scale
from 1 (left wing) to 10 (right wing), residence in the city of
BuenosAires, residence in a large city other thanBuenosAires,
and interview year. Finally, almost every study on political
participation uses income as a control variable.11 One of the10. Agricultural policy has been a contentious issue in Argentina, par-
ticularly following the boom in agricultural commodity prices in the mid-
2000s. Agricultural goods represent about 50% of the country’s exports.
11. Ideally we would also have a good scale measure for factual po-
litical knowledge. Unfortunately, the information necessary for such a
scale does not exist across the different waves of the survey data we use.
Rather, we rely upon our measures of educational attainment and income
to control for political knowledge; a range of studies of measures of po-
litical knowledge and information has shown a positive and often strong
This content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms main issues with this variable is the large degree of survey
nonresponse. Data from multiple years for Argentina also
suffer from the effects of high inﬂation that make temporal
comparisons hard to assess. To avoid both these problems we
constructed a proxy for income based on the number of the
following items respondents report having at home: refrig-
erator, landline telephone, cellular telephone, car, washing
machine, microwave oven, motorcycle, indoor plumbing, in-
door bathroom, computer, internet, TV, ﬂat panel TV, and
connection to the sewage system.
Finally, below we focus on presentation of the results that
are estimated on data pooled across these three different
waves of the LAPOP data for Argentina. Missing values in the
variables included in the analysis were imputed using the R
packagemice (Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011). Pool-
ing the data across the three waves requires that we assume
that the parameters are invariant with respect to time, an as-
sumption that we discuss further in the paper’s online ap-
pendix (where we present results for each of the three sur-
vey years, estimated using a hierarchical model with year
effects). There is little evidence of substantial differences in
the model estimates between the three survey waves, and
by pooling across the three waves we increase the efﬁciency of
our analysis, thus providing more accurate estimates.
RESULTS
We estimated our models via Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods, using the software package JAGS (Plum-
mer 2003). In estimating our ﬁrst-stage model, we applied ﬂat
normal priors on aj and ﬂat log-normal priors on aC,j and
aU,j. Additionally, we set categorical priors on participatory
classes TC,i and TU,i, and Dirichlet priors on type probabili-
ties. We let the MCMC algorithm run until all parameters
of the 1-stage (measurement) model had converged to their
stable posterior distribution. After that, we estimated our
second-stage (explanatory) model Jp 30 times, using a dif-
ferent draw from the posterior distribution of participatory
types as dependent variable at each jth instance, to incor-
porate classiﬁcation uncertainty. In estimating our second-
stage model, we applied ﬂat multivariate normal priors on
Bt. According to Gelman and Rubin’s (1992) convergence di-
agnostic, coefﬁcients from both ﬁrst- and second-stage mod-
els converged to their invariant posterior distribution.
Participatory types and political involvement
Participatory types are not ﬁxed for each individual. Instead,
each respondent has a probability of being assigned to eachcorrelation between education, income, and political knowledge (Alvarez
1997; Barabas et al. 2014; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).
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the relationship between the probability of being assigned a
high conventional type and the probability of being assigned
a high unconventional type. Each point in the plot corre-
sponds to a survey respondent. Based on these individual level
probabilities for each individual, we computed predicted types
by considering their modal assignment. Speciﬁcally, those as-
signed a high type more than 50% of the time were classiﬁed
as having a high type in either conventional or unconventional
participation, and the rest were classiﬁed as low type.
As a result, 80.9% of the sample was classiﬁed as having
low conventional participatory type, and 90.3% as having a
low unconventional participatory type. From there, we divide
the classiﬁcation into four categories of participatory types.
Starting in the upper right cell are the activists, who are clas-
siﬁed as high conventional and high unconventional partici-
pation, and are only 2.7% of the sample. Moving clockwise,
in the lower right cell are those classiﬁed as low unconven-
tional and high conventional types, which we call the con-This content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ventionals, and they are 16.4% of the sample. Next, in the
lower left cell of ﬁgure 1 are the outsiders, who are 73.9% of
the sample, and who are classiﬁed as low unconventional and
low conventional participation. Finally in the upper left cell
of ﬁgure 1 are the agitators, comprising 7.0% of the sample;
they are individuals who are classiﬁed as high unconventional
and low conventional participation.
Table 1 shows the point estimates and 95% credible in-
tervals for the aC,j and aU,j parameters. These are estimates of
the effect of high conventional and high unconventional pre-
dispositions on participation in activity j. Note that one pa-
rameter in each column is normalized to 0.00 for identiﬁ-
cation (blockade, for conventional participation; municipal
meetings, for unconventional participation). As expected, the
parameters reﬂecting the effect of the high conventional type
(aC, j’s) are larger for conventional activities than unconven-
tional ones, in particular the parameters for municipal meet-
ings, contacting the municipality, contacting authorities, and
attending improvement meetings. Similarly, the parametersFigure 1. Distribution of type assignments. The plot depicts the relationship between the probability of being assigned a high conventional type (horizontal
axis) and the probability of being assigned a high unconventional type (vertical axis) for individual respondents in the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Argentina LAPOP
surveys. Each quadrant corresponds to a face of political participation (activists, conventionals, outsiders, and agitators). Circles represent survey re-
spondents..070.231 on January 04, 2018 08:17:38 AM
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for unconventional activities, especially protesting, and par-
ticipation in strikes and blockades. This result implies that the
consideration of two dimensions of political participation—
conventional and unconventional—is supported by the ob-
served behavior of the individuals in our data. It is worth
noting that the coefﬁcients for attending party meetings and
working for a party have estimates that are quite similar for
both the conventional and unconventional participatory types,
perhaps reﬂecting the nature of the party system, or the result
of weak partisan afﬁliations in contemporary Argentina (e.g.,
Arce and Mangonnet 2013; Lupu 2013). These two activities
also serve as a warning against ad hoc classiﬁcations of ac-
tivities, as they clearly defy a straightforward categorization.
Our model, on the other hand, allows us to incorporate the
dual nature of these two activities, by allowing them to load
on both the conventional and unconventional participatory
types.
Figure 2 shows the predicted participation probabilities
in each activity for the four combinations of conventional and
unconventional types, calculated from the estimated param-
eters for the high conventional and unconventional types, and
the activity speciﬁc intercepts (aj’s). The activities are ordered
according to the extent to which they are affected by con-
ventional predispositions (that is, fromhigheraC,j to loweraC,j).
Political activities such as participation in protests, strikes, and
street blockades are less affected by conventional inclinations
and are therefore located toward the extreme right of the spec-
trum. Among the unconventional activities, the results show
that individuals in all participatory types are more likely toThis content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms participate in protests than in strikes and street blockades.
While agitators and activists are more than 86% likely to do
so, conventionals are 13% likely to do so, and outsiders about
4% likely to participate in protests. Involvement in street
blockades is extremely unlikely for individuals with low un-
conventional types (conventionals and outsiders); but for the
high unconventional types, the probability of engaging in a
street blockade is around 50%. Finally, while participation
in strikes is unlikely for outsiders and conventionals category,
individuals with high unconventional participatory types (ag-
itators and activists) have propensities to participate in strikes
of more than 30%. This is smaller than propensities to par-
ticipate in protests and street blockades, which might be due
to the fact that participation in strikes is possible only for
individuals who are employed.
Amongconventional political activities, outsiders show low
propensities to participate in all activities (below 5%), except
for contributing to solving a community problem, where they
are 16% likely to participate. For individuals classiﬁed as con-
ventionals, participation probabilities for conventional activ-
ities range from around 18% for working for a political party
to 58% for helping solve a community problem. But for in-
dividuals in the agitators category, the probability of partici-
pating in conventional activities lies between 10% and 21%,
except for participation in municipal meetings (which re-
mains close to zero) and contributing to solving a commu-
nity problem (about 39%). A conventional activity where
the likelihood of participation is relatively large for agitators
is participation in meetings of political parties (about 21%).
Qualitatively, it is clear that agitators and conventionals areTable 1. Participatory Types and Political InvolvementConventional.070.231 on Janua
and Conditions (htUnconventionalMean 95% Credible Interval Meanry 04, 2018 08:
tp://www.journ95% Credible IntervalMunicipal meetings 3.73 (3.16, 4.51) .00 (.00, .00)
Improvement meeting 3.34 (2.95, 3.76) 2.17 (1.74, 2.60)
Party meeting 3.19 (2.78, 3.64) 2.93 (2.50, 3.42)
Contact authorities 2.98 (2.66, 3.33) 1.43 (1.03, 1.81)
Contact municipality 2.62 (2.34, 2.90) 1.11 (.77, 1.44)
Work for party 2.37 (2.04, 2.72) 1.95 (1.57, 2.32)
Association meeting 2.18 (1.85, 2.51) 1.42 (1.04, 1.80)
Solve problem 1.97 (1.75, 2.19) 1.21 (.94, 1.48)
Protest 1.25 (.81, 1.66) 5.06 (4.48, 5.72)
Strike .15 (.00, .70) 3.49 (3.08, 3.91)
Block .00 (.00, .00) 5.24 (4.60, 6.18)Note. The table provides posterior means and 95% credible intervals for parameters aC,j’s (cols. 1 and 2) and aU,j’s (cols. 3 and 4).
These parameters capture the inﬂuence of each latent trait (conventional and unconventional, respectively) on participation in
each political activity. The larger the estimate for activity j, the greater the inﬂuence of the corresponding latent trait.17:38 AM
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that the difference between agitators and conventionalsarethat
the conventionals are somewhat more likely to be involved in
conventional political activities than the agitators; the agitators
are somewhat more likely to be involved in unconventional
forms of participation. Finally, individuals classiﬁed as activ-
ists show participation probabilities above 48% for all con-
ventional activities except participating in municipal meet-
ings and strikes (where the probability lies around 22%). The
conventional activities with the highest propensities for this
group are participating in party meetings, engaging in meet-
ings of improvements committees, and contributing to solv-
ing a community problem, reaching more than 80%.
Overall, our results show that individuals with low un-
conventional types (outsiders and agitators) are more likely
to engage in conventional activities that involve a low degree
of engagement, like requesting help from authorities or the
municipality, whereas individuals with high unconventional
type (agitators and activists) are more likely to engage in con-
ventional activities that require a greater involvement, like
participating in improvement committees and political partyThis content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms meetings. Our results also indicate that contributing to solve
a community problem cannot be easily characterized as ei-
ther a conventional or unconventional activity, as all partic-
ipatory types show relatively high participation probabilities
(about 82%, 58%, 39%, and 16% probabilities for activists,
conventionals, agitators, and outsiders, respectively).Inﬂuence of individual attributes
on type assignment
We start by examining our coefﬁcient estimates and their
associated 95% credible intervals, shown in ﬁgure 3. As noted
before, to identify the model, we use the outsider type (low
conventional andunconventional participationpropensities)
as a baseline. The results suggest that greater educational at-
tainment is relatedwith an increased likelihoodof activist and
agitator assignment. The next result is consistent with pre-
vious researchonpolitical participation: age is associatedwith
an increased likelihood of being involved as a high conven-
tional type. The common ﬁnding that older individuals are
more engaged in political activities holds insofar as the ac-Figure 2. Participation probabilities by type. The plot depicts the baseline probabilities of participating in each political activity for individuals of each type
(outsiders, agitators, conventionals, and activists). For each type, activities are sorted (from left to right) and colored (progressing from lighter to darker
shades) from more to less conventional as measured by aC,j’s (see ﬁrst column of table 1). Bars indicate posterior means and segments represent 95%
credible intervals for baseline participation probabilities..070.231 on January 04, 2018 08:17:38 AM
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increased likelihood of being a high conventional or unconventional type for
those individuals interviewed in 2010 is possibly a reﬂection of the height-
ened levels of political conﬂict observed during 2009. Part of this was the af-
termath of the 2008 conﬂict between the government and farmers, but it also
included the passage of a controversial media law. Moreover, it coincided with
the lowest levels of conﬁdence in the national government of the Kirchner era
(2003–15), as well as with the 2009 legislative elections, that were moved from
their usual October date to earlier in June, and during which the government
performed poorly and lost its majority in both chambers of Congress.
Volume 79 Number 4 October 2017 / 1397tivities considered are conventional ones but appears untrue
for unconventional activities. Women are more likely to be-
long to types that engage more actively in conventional ac-
tivities relative to the baseline type, although the gender gap
in participation is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The estimates for the indicator variable for nonwhite re-
spondents show that they are more likely to belong to any of
the three participatory types with respect to being an out-
sider, though not signiﬁcantly so. Higher income, in turn, is
associated with lower likelihood of being assigned a conven-
tional or activist type, relative to being an outsider. Individ-
uals with a more right-wing ideology are less likely to be an
agitator or activist butmore likely to be conventional, relative
to the baseline, suggesting that right-wing individuals have
a preference toward conventional activities rather than un-
conventional ones. Finally, being interviewed in 2012 or 2014
is associated with a considerably lower likelihood of being
involved as a high conventional or unconventional type, com-
pared to those interviewed in 2010, the year of the Argentina
Bicentennial celebrations.12 In online appendix D we present12. Given that the 2010 interviews were conducted between March and
April, the participation questions cover a signiﬁcant portion of 2009. The
This content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms the estimates of a model where covariate effects are allowed
to vary by year. The coefﬁcients for the different years are
generally consistent with one another, so we focus on the
pooled coefﬁcients.
Since the model coefﬁcients are difﬁcult to interpret, we
simulated baseline probabilities of assignment to each par-
ticipatory type and marginal effects of changes in the main
explanatory variables of interest on the likelihood of being
classiﬁed into the different types, relative to the baseline, for
a hypothetical individual with typical sociodemographic
characteristics.13 We also calculated 95% credible intervalsFigure 3. Determinants of assignment into participatory types. The plot depicts posterior means and 95% credible intervals for the coefﬁcients of our second-
stage multinomial logit model.13. The hypothetical individual has 11 years of education, is 37 years
of age, male, white, with an income proxy level of 9 on a scale of 0–14, an
ideology of 5 on a 10-point left to right scale, thinks that the national
economic situation has improved over the last 12 months, that his personal
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signment probabilities stand at 6.4% for the activist type; at
9.2% for the agitator type; and at 18.8% for the conventional
type. This leaves a high chance (65.6%) of assignment into
the outsider type. Figures 4, 5, and 6 depict credible intervals
indicating the effect of marginal changes in covariates of
interest on assignment probabilities.
Our simulations show that perceptions of a deterioration
in the national economy are associated with lower proba-
bility of assignment into the activist type and higher prob-
ability of assignment into the outsider type (see ﬁg. 4, left
panel), although effects are small inmagnitude. In particular,
thinking that the national economy got worse instead of
improving, is associated with a 3.0 percentage point decrease
in the likelihood of assignment into the activist type and
3.7 percentage point increase in the probability of outsider
type. A voter’s personal ﬁnancial outlook has no signiﬁcant
effects in general (ﬁg. 4, right panel). These results are in-
consistent with hypothesis 1a, as they suggest that there is a
moderately negative correlation between a worsened outlook
about the national economy and individuals’ classiﬁcation14. Table C1, available in online appendix C, gives baseline proba-
bilities of assignment to each type (ﬁrst row of the table) and marginal
effects for covariates included in the model (rows 2–13).
economic situation has also improved over the same period, has not been a
victim of a crime in the last 12 months, believes corruption is a little gen-
eralized, does not live in the capital of the country nor in a big city, and was
interviewed in 2010.
This content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms into high participatory types, instead of a positive one. Simi-
larly, our ﬁndings do not support hypothesis 1b, that self-
located concerns depress political participation, as responses
to this variable fall below statistical conﬁdence levels.
The minor importance of national economic evaluations
for explaining assignment into high participatory types is
somewhat surprising given the preeminence of economic
concerns inArgentina. Indeed,whencitizens inArgentina are
asked about the issues they consider to be the most impor-
tant the country faces, economic considerations like unem-
ployment and inﬂation are invariably on top of the list in
recent years (LAPOP 2010, 2012, 2014). The absence of a mo-
bilization effect of economic concerns could signify that cit-
izens view economic problems as bigger than themselves and
unlikely to be affected by their decision to participate polit-
ically. But it could also mean that economic motivations for
political participation were not particularly important dur-
ing the period under study; since these surveys were con-
ducted during the recovery from the ﬁnancial crisis reces-
sion, economic concerns could be dampened in importance
relative to the immediate past.15 Moreover, it is possible thatFigure 4. Marginal effects of economic evaluations. The plots depict the effects of a marginal decline in evaluations of the national (left) and personal (right)
economy, from “better” to “worse,” on the probabilities of being assigned outsider, agitator, conventional, and activist types. Points indicate posterior means
and segments represent 95% credible intervals for the marginal effects.15. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that in 2014
Argentina was in recession. But it is worth noting that the 2014 wave of
the LAPOP survey was conducted earlier in the year. Therefore, economic
evaluations refer, for the most part, to 2013, a year with mild economic
growth. Moreover, ﬁgure D1 in the online appendix, which displays co-
efﬁcient effects by year, shows that economic evaluations in 2014 had
similar effects to those of the other years in the sample.
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economic crises (as in the late 1990s and early 2000s), eco-
nomic concerns trigger political participation only in situa-
tions in which the national economic or personal ﬁnances are
exceptionally problematic and citizens are highly motivated
to induce political leaders for a change in the economic di-
rection of the country.
Next, we examined the relationship between the percep-
tion of corruption and type assignment. We found that in-
dividuals who think that corruption among public ofﬁcials is
“very generalized” instead of “a little generalized” are 2.6 per-
centage points more likely to be assigned an outsider type
and 3.0 percentage points more likely to be assigned an agi-
tator type (see ﬁg. 5). Conversely, a similar increase in the per-
ception of corruption is associated with a 3.8 percentage point
reduction in the probability of being assigned conventional
type, and 1.8 percentage point reduction in the probability
of activist assignment. Although some of these effects do not
reach our threshold of statistical signiﬁcance, the changes are
consistent with the idea that individuals who doubt the hon-
esty of government ofﬁcials are more likely to get involved in
unconventional political activities, thus becoming less likely
to be assigned to the conventional and activist types; while
at the same time becoming more likely to get involved in
unconventional ways, thus increasing assignments into agi-
tators and partly compensating for the higher likelihood of
becoming outsiders. These results are consistent with hypoth-
esis 2.
Finally, we found that victims of a crime show an increased
likelihood of being assigned to all types relative to the out-This content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms siders baseline (ﬁg. 6). This is consistent with the mobiliza-
tion effect found in recent studies of the impact of crime
victimization on political participation, and in line with hy-
pothesis 3a. Overall, being the victim of a crime decreases the
likelihood of being labeled an outsider by as many as 10.4 per-
centage points. In terms of effect magnitude, no other indi-
vidual attribute—among those included in our explanatory
model—rivals the inﬂuence of crime victimization. The pos-
itive effect of crime victimization on political participation
is largest for the classiﬁcation into activist and conventional
types, increasing their likelihood by 5.0 and 4.5 percentage
points, respectively. The type with only unconventional par-
ticipatory subtype (that is, agitators) shows smaller increases
(3.0 percentage points). This last result contradicts hypoth-
esis 3b, as it suggests that the mobilization effect of crime
victimization is less intense for unconventional forms of in-
volvement than for conventional ones.
DISCUSSION
In this paper we argue that previous research on political par-
ticipation has been limited, in that it has focused narrowly on
conventional and unconventional involvement as indepen-
dent forms of political expression. This is partly due to the fact
that much of the research on participation has not studied
cases like Argentina, where unconventional activities are rel-
atively more common. It is also partly due to the fact that
many studies have used methodologies that in general lead
researchers to assume that these two types of activities are
independent. Instead, we study participation in a nation
where unconventional forms of political activity occur, andFigure 5. Marginal effects of perceptions of corruption. The plot depicts
the effects of a marginal increase in perceptions of corruption, from “a little”
to “very” generalized, on the probabilities of being assigned outsider, agi-
tator, conventional, and activist types. Points indicate posterior means and
segments represent 95% credible intervals for the marginal effects.Figure 6. Marginal effects of crime victimization. The plot depicts the ef-
fects of having been the victim of a crime on the probabilities of being as-
signed outsider, agitator, conventional, and activist types. Points indicate
posterior means and segments represent 95% credible intervals for the mar-
ginal effects..070.231 on January 04, 2018 08:17:38 AM
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tion, where citizens can simultaneously participate conven-
tionally and unconventionally, do neither, or do one but not
the other. This is an important point, as citizens can relate to
the polity by using some political activities as complements
or substitutes of the others. We advocate the use of latent
class analysis, as it allows us to classify citizens as being one
of four participatory types and thus provide a linkage be-
tween participation in different activities by the same indi-
vidual; this approach also lets us examine what individual
and contextual variables are associated with each type of par-
ticipation. Thus our paper has both methodological and sub-
stantive implications.
We apply this methodology to recent survey data from
Argentina, as it provides an excellent laboratory to test a
number of hypotheses about how different individual and
contextual factors might best be associated with each form
of participation. We ﬁnd that respondents who view corrup-
tion as generalized are more likely to be involved in uncon-
ventional political activities and less so in conventional ones.
Perhaps most importantly, we ﬁnd that crime victimization
encourages participation in both conventional and uncon-
ventional political activities. Finally, our results do not pro-
vide support for the expected association between the state
of the economy and either conventional or unconventional
political participation. Taken together, these ﬁndings sug-
gest that during periods of relative economic stability, eco-
nomic anxieties are not translated into political action. Dis-
tressful experiences of a noneconomic nature (in the form of
crime victimization), however, greatly increase people’s po-
litical engagement.
The approach we develop here has applications in other
nations, in particular those that have a greater incidence of
unconventional forms of participation. By using this ap-
proach cross-nationally, we can better identify the associa-
tion between contextual factors and forms of participation,
in particular factors like economic performance, electoral
institutions, and governmental institutions. There are many
ways in which nations differ, in their electoral rules (e.g.,
compulsory voting), culture, and political history. How those
factors may shape the calculations behind conventional and
unconventional participation needs further study. This is
particularly true for the question of compulsory voting: while
we do not believe that Argentina’s compulsory voting policy
has a signiﬁcant effect on the external validity of our results,
that is an important question for future research. It will also
be important for future work to test whether political systems
that have more open and ﬂuid means of conventional politi-
cal participation have more citizens who participate in those
ways, and whether more closed political systems with fewerThis content downloaded from 131.215
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms opportunities for conventional participation lead more citi-
zens to take the unconventional approach to expressing their
political preferences.
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